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CANCELLATION OF FIRE INSURANCE POLICIES
BYRON BEATTY SERVIES'
T HERE are in use in the United States three principal
forms of fire insurance policies, or some variation
thereof made necessary by statute-the Massachusetts,2
the old New York3 and the new New York 4 standard
1 Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law;
associated with Marsh & McLennan, Incorporated, Insurance Brokers.
2 The Massachusetts standard cancellation clause adopted in 1887 reads
as follows: 'This policy may be cancelled at any time at the request
of the insured, who shall thereupon be entitled to a return of the portion
of the above premium remaining, after deducting the customary monthly
short rates for the time this policy shall have been in force. The com-
pany also reserves the right, after giving written notice to the insured
and to any mortgagee to whom this policy is made payable, and tender-
ing to the insured a ratable proportion of the premium, to cancel this
policy as to all risks subsequent to the expiration of ten days from such
notice, and no mortgagee shall then have the right to recover as to such
risks. ''
3 The old New York standard cancellation clause adopted in 1887 reads
as follows: "This policy shall be cancelled at any time at the request
of the insured; or by the company by giving five days' notice of such
cancellation. If this policy shall be cancelled as hereinbefore provided,
or become void or cease, the premium having been actually paid, the un-
earned portion shall be returned on surrender of this policy or last re-
newal, this company retaining the customary short rate; except that
when this policy is cancelled by this company by giving notice it shall
retain only the pro rata premium.'
4 The new New York standard cancellation clause adopted in 1918
reads as follows: "This policy shall be cancelled at any time at the
request of the insured, in which case the Company shall, upon demand
and surrender of this policy, refund the excess of paid premium above
the customary short rates for the expired time. This policy may be
cancelled at any time by the Company by giving to the insured a five
days' written notice of cancellation with or without tender of the excess
of paid premium above the pro rata premium for the expired time, which
excess, if not tendered, shall be refunded on demand. Notice of cancel-
lation shall state that said excess premium (if not tendered) will be
refunded on demand."
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
forms. These three standard forms of fire policy con-
stitute the basis for the preparation of practically all the
fire insurance contracts underwritten on property in this
country. After noting the age of these three forms, espe-
cially the earlier two, it might reasonably be expected
that a wealth of decisions would by now have been handed
down respecting all parts of these important documents
and such is the case. Here, however, will be treated only
a few of the legal high lights of one clause in these forms
and certain matters related thereto, namely, the cancella-
tion clause. Because of prevailing economic disturbances
threatening the financial collapse of some fire insurance
companies and many assureds and the consequent jeop-
ardizing of the interests of lenders by reason of inade-
quate or vanishing fire insurance protection, the can-
cellation of fire insurance policies develops considerable
present importance.
The right of either party to cancel a policy of fire in-
surance is dependent upon the terms of the policy. In
the earlier days of insurance no cancellation clauses were
generally placed in the policies and, therefore, no cancel-
lation except possibly by mutual consent could take place.
The omission of a cancellation clause from the policy was
sometimes embarrassing and troublesome to the assured,
especially where the subject matter at risk was destroyed,
before the termination of the policy, by a hazard or risk
not covered or insured thereby. A case 5 of this character,
and one which tends to emphasize the importance of a
cancellation clause, arose during the American Revolu-
tion and was decided by an English court in 1777. The
policy in that suit, containing no cancellation clause, in-
sured the ship "Isabella" for a period of twelve months
from August 19, 1776 to August 19, 1777, the ship being
warranted free from captures and seizures by the Ameri-
cans. The ship sailed from London and was taken by
an American privateer (a risk not insured against) about
two months after the inception of the policy. Since a full
year's premium had been paid and since only two months
5 Tyrie v. Fletcher, 2 Cowp. 666.
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of the term of the contract had been exhausted, the as-
sured naturally felt that a return of a portion of the
premium paid would be in order. He sued for such re-
turn premium but was non-suited, the court, through Lord
Mansfield saying, in part:
It was very proper to save this case for the opinion of the
Court, because in all mercantile transactions, certainty is of
much more consequence, than which way the point is decided;
and more especially so, in the case of policies of insurance; be-
cause, if the parties do not chuse to contract according to the
established rule, they are at liberty as between themselves to vary
it. This case is stript of every authority. There is no case or
practice in point; and, therefore, we must argue from the general
principles applicable to all policies of insurance. And I take
it, there are two general rules established, applicable to this ques-
tion: the first is, that where the risk has not been run, whether
its not having been run was owing to the fault, pleasure, or will
of the insured, or to any other cause, the premium shall be re-
turned: because a policy of insurance is a contract of indemnity.
The under-writer receives a premium for running the risk of
indemnifying the insured, and whatever cause it be owing to, if
he does not run the risk, the consideration, for which the pre-
mium or money was put into his hands, fails, and therefore he
ought to return it. 2. Another rule is, that if that risk of the
contract of indemnity has once commenced, there shall be no
apportionment or return of 'premium afterwards. For though
the premium is estimated, and the risk depends upon the nature
and length of the voyage, yet, if it has commenced, though it be
only for twenty-four hours or less, the risk is run; the contract is
for the whole entire risk, and no part of the consideration shall be
returned.
Practically every fire insurance contract issued in this
country today contains a cancellation clause. Some are
still issued abroad without such clause.6 In policies con-
taining cancellation clauses, the right to cancellation
seems to be absolute and no reasons need be assigned by
6 See "Copies of Standard Policies, etc." published in 1932 by Lloyd's
Underwriters' Fire and Non-Marine Association.
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either party for terminating the contract. The motive
prompting cancellation is immaterial.7
Cancellation of fire insurance policies may be effected
in several different ways; for example, by the insolvency
of the insurance company itself, by mutual agreement be-
tween the assured and the company, by request of the as-
sured at any time, or by the company serving the required
amount of notice on the assured.
Among large buyers of fire insurance and in the busi-
ness of fire insurance itself there is now considerable in-
terest manifested in the subjdct of involuntary cancella-
tion of fire insurance policies occasioned by judicial ad-
judication of insolvency of the insurance company. A
recent case8 says that "the weight of authority supports
the proposition that upon the judicial adjudication of the
insolvency of a stock insurance company and the appoint-
ment of a receiver, the outstanding policies of the com-
pany are ipso facto cancelled and that claim for loss there-
after occurring is not a provable claim against the com-
pany. The policyholders are creditors for the value of
their policies at the time of the breach thus occurring,
which in most cases is the pro rata return premium."
There are, however, some apparent exceptions to this
rule. Several of the southern states require a fire insur-
ance company, as one of the conditions precedent to its
entry into and license from the state, to file a surety bond
with a designated officer conditioned upon the company 's
paying its obligations incurred therein. Where, there-
fore, an Illinois company, doing business in the State of
Louisiana was forced into receivership and liquidation
through proceedings in an Illinois court, Louisiana resi-
dents being without actual notice of the Illinois decree
appointing the receiver and decreeing liquidation, a resi-
dent of Louisiana, holding a policy of the company issued
in Louisiana insuring property in that state, could, even
7 Camp v. Aetna Insurance Company, 170 Ga. 46; Pearson et a]. v.
General Casualty and Surety Company, 107 N. J. L. 509.
8 National Union Fire Insurance Company v. Bynum, 183 Ark. 1100.
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after the appointment of the Illinois receiver, recover a
Louisiana judgment for a loss occurring after the date of
the receivership and could satisfy the same by proceeding
against the sureties on the company's bond filed in Louisi-
ana when the company became licensed in that state?
This case and similar cases therein cited seem to have
been decided on the ground that the Illinois court did not
have jurisdiction over the person of the Louisiana policy-
holder and especially where the latter had no notice of
the Illinois decree and hence no opportunity to protect
himself by obtaining other insurance.
In that class of cases where the policies are cancelled
by mutual agreement, the notice of cancellation is deemed
waived by both parties and cancellation is considered
effective immediately. This class of cases frequently de-
velops under interesting although intricate circumstances.
In this country a very large part of the fire insurance
business is carried on through local agents of the com-
panies who respectively reside in the localities where the
properties to be insured are owned and situated. The
individual local agent may hold a license from each of
several companies. An owner of property in the locality
where the agent may reside may instruct the agent to in-
sure and to keep insured certain property. The agent
will, therefore, be acting in a dual capacity; he will be the
assured's agent to procure and to keep in force a policy
of insurance on the property, and he will be the insurance
company's agent to write up and deliver the policy and
collect the premium. If, therefore, an assured gives spe-
cific instructions to the local agent who happens to be
agent of several different companies to keep assured's
property covered by insurance, such local agent, as agent
for the assured, may, when the company who has insured
the property instructs him to cancel the policy, surrender
to the company such policy for immediate cancellation
and immediately rewrite a new policy in another com-
piy represented by him. In the event of a loss after the
9 Federico Macaroni Manufacturing Company v. Great Western Fire
Insurance Company et al., 173 La. 905.
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new policy is written but before the customary five day
cancellation period on the old policy has elapsed, the
company issuing the new policy is the one to pay the loss.
The New York Court of Appeals recently summed up the
principle here involved as follows:
It is a principle of almost universal acceptance that where an
assured has applied for insurance to an agent having authority
to write policies for many companies, has left to the agent the
selection of the companies, with instructions to maintain the in-
surance in an amount stated, and the agent has undertaken so to
act, the agent, upon notice from his companies to cancel, has
power to waive for the assured the five day period of cancella-
tion, to cancel the policies at once, and immediately to write new
policies in other companies for the assured, so that the new poli-
cies become at once effective. 10
The assured, on the other hand, may himself deliver
the policy to the company or to its agent and at once
secure his return premium. The policy is then cancelled
and no loss is covered thereafter. Ordinarily where the
assured addresses a letter to the company requesting can-
cellation and encloses the policy for surrender, the policy
remains in force until it is actually received by the com-
pany and any loss occurring while the letter and policy are
in transit in the mails is covered." Where there are sev-
eral different interests insured under the same policy, it
cannot be cancelled by any assured so as to affect individ-
ual interests without the consent of each. For instance,
the mortgagee whose interest is insured with that of the
mortgagor in the same policy and who holds it as secur-
ity has no power to cancel it, 12 and likewise the mortgagor
cannot cancel so as to affect the mortgagee's interest
therein. 8
10 Rose Inn Corporation v. National Union Fire Insurance Company
et al., 258 N. Y. 51.
11 Wagner & Erling Company v. Fort Dearborn Casualty Unde.rwriters,
Inc., et al., 57 S. D. 194.
12 Bache v. Great Lakes Insurance Company, 151 Wash. 494; Conti-
nental Insurance Company v. Parkes, 142 Ala. 650.
13 General Insurance Company of America v. Allen, 40 Fed. (2)-384.
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If the volume of litigation be taken as an index to im-
portance, the most important phase of the subject of
cancellation is that branch having to do with cancellations
initiated and effected by the insurance company itself.
The courts lean toward holding a policy of insurance in
force in practically all cases where the company has not
precisely followed all the terms of the cancellation clause
permitting it to retire from, or relieve itself of, the risk
before the policy period has fully expired.14 The notice
must be direct, peremptory, explicit, and unconditional;
no expression of desire, wish, or intention to cancel in the
future will be sufficient. 5 A reference to the new New
York form of cancellation clause shows that the notice
of cancellation shall state that the return premium, if
not tendered, will be refunded on demand. In a compara-
tively recent Michigan case,' 6 the failure of the company
to make such statement in the notice when attempting to
cancel was fatal to an effective cancellation and a loss
thereafter accruing within the policy term was covered.
One court has even gone so far as to say that since no
provision is made for sending notice by registered mail,
the sending of a notice in that fashion is unsafe since it
materially reduces the chance of assured receiving the
letter, and failure of the postal authorities to find and to
deliver to the addressee so as to secure his receipt pre-
vents effective cancellation.
17
Notices of cancellation emanating from the company's
office or from the office of one of its agents should be
signed with the company's name and addressed to each
and all of the several parties having an interest in the
insurance policy. If there are two or more assureds or
parties in interest, such as persons designated in the
14 Pomerantz v. Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Chester County,
279 Pa. 479; Molyneaux v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 235 Mich. 678.
15 George Richards, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance (3rd Ed.),
par. 286, citing Van Tassel v. Greenwich Insurance Company, 151 N. Y.
130, and other cases.
10 Molyneaux v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 235 Mich. 678.
17 Werner et a]. v. Commonwealth Casualty Company, 9 N. J. Misc.
R. 963. See also same case, 109 N. J. L. 119.
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policy to receive the proceeds, notices must be sent to
each of them. The insurance world is familiar with two
general clauses, usually in the form of endorsements or
riders attached to the printed forms of standard policies
whereby mortgagees are designated as interested parties
in the contract of insurance. One of these clauses is the
union or standard mortgage clause; the other is the sim-
ple loss payable clause. Under the union or standard
mortgage clause, the mortgagee is, by express stipulation,
entitled to notice of cancellation; ordinarily any cancella-
tion notice sent to the assured but not to the mortgagee
named in the union or standard mortgage clause would
be ineffective to cut off such mortgagee 's rights to re-
covery on the policy; but even under the simple loss pay-
able clause a mortgagee is likewise entitled to notice of
cancellation.' The cases supporting this principle seem
to proceed on the theory that since the cancellation clause
does not specify to whom notices shall be given, it is no
more than just that the insurance company or its agents
should notify all parties named in the policy of the in-
tended cancellation.' 9
In the purchase of insurance, practically always three,
and very often, in the large centers of population, four
persons are connected with such a transaction. These are
the assured, the company's agent, and the company itself.
A fourth party may be the assured's broker. For the
purposes of this discussion the assured and his broker
stand on one side of the transaction and the company and
its agent on the other. While the assured's broker is held
in law to be the assured's agent in all transactions and
negotiations relating to effecting the insurance,"0 he is by
the great weight of authority not assured's agent to ac-
cept on behalf of the assured a notice of cancellation,
18 Lattan v. Royal Insurance Company, 45 N. J. L. 453; Lee et al. v.
New Hampshire Insurance Company, 154 N. C. 446; Rawl v. American
Central Insurance Company, 94 S. C. 299; Glasscock et al. v. Liverpool,
London & Globe Insurance Company, 188 S. W. 281.
19 Lattan v. Royal Insurance Company, 45 N. J. L. 453.
20 Ritson v. Atlas Assurance Company, Ltd., 181 N. E. 393.
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unless such broker has plenary authority or is specifically
authorized to make such acceptance.2
The amount of the notice must be that which is stated
in the cancellation clause. The effective date usually
stated in the notice or the date that the notice is mailed
are not controlling. The time only begins to run from
the day the notice is actually received by the assured who
must generally be allowed the full period provided for
by the cancellation clause, computed commencing with the
next ensuing day2 2 after assured has received the notice.
Actual receipt of the notice by the assured seems to be
necessary to effect a cancellation. 23 The insurance com-
panies, in their anxiety to secure assured's signature on
a receipt to evidence cancellation, frequently send notices
of cancellation by registered mail. This practice often
defeats effective cancellation where assured cannot im-
mediately be found by the postman, who returns it after
a time to the sender.24 In some policies, particularly
those on automobiles, the company sometimes adds to the
cancellation clause a sentence which says, "Notice of
cancellation mailed to the address of the assured stated
in this policy shall be a sufficient notice. "2 Even under
this additional language to the cancellation clause, it is
not, in the writer's judgment, safe to assume that can-
cellation is, by the mere act of mailing the notice, effected
the requisite number of days after the letter is delivered
by the postman at the address of assured stated in the
policy. Delivery at the address named in the policy is
not synonymous with actual receipt by assured. The
courts might well take the position that such phraseology
21 Kinney v. Rochester German Insurance Company, 141 Ill. App. 543.
22 Penn Plate Glass Company v. Spring Garden Insurance Company,
189 Pa. St. 255. See also Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. Tewes,
132 Ill. App. 321; notes, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 829; German Union Fire
Insurance Company v. Fred G. Clarke Company, 116 Md. 622.
2
3 Werner et al. v. Commonwealth Casualty Company, 9 N. J. Misc. R.
963. See also same case in 109 N. J. L. 119.
24 See cases under footnotes 23 and 25.
25 American Automobile Insurance Company v. Watts, 12 Ala. App. 518.
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merely identifies the method to be used in effecting can-
cellations, since there are other methods; for instance,
telegraph, telephone, word of mouth or registered mail,
the designation of any one of which methods would still
leave open the question as to whether actual receipt of
the notice of cancellation were necessary. The principal
reason upon which it is thought that actual receipt is nec-
essary even under the additional clause just quoted is that
that time (that is, the day of actual receipt) is the most
logical and reasonable day of departure for computing
the five day cancellation period. The courts might, no
doubt, hold it unreasonable, owing to the great distances
in this country, to measure the five day period from the
time the insurance company mailed the notice; and no
date being mentioned in the policy from which to compute
the five day period it is reasonable to suppose that the
courts would compute it five days from the time the as-
sured actually received the notice, or in any event five
days after a time when, under the circumstances, it is
reasonable to suppose he should have received it.
The one single factor which insurance companies most
frequently fail to observe when endeavoring to cancel fire
insurance policies is the return of the unearned paid pre-
mium in cash with the notice of cancellation. Under the
old New York and Massachusetts standard forms it is
almost universally, either by decisions or by statutes, held
to be a condition precedent that the company return with
the notice of cancellation the cash unearned paid pre-
mium.26  The reason for this rule seems to be that the
26 The following are the states wherein, by reason of court decisions
or provisions in the statutes, the company must tender the unearned
premium with the notice of cancellation before the cancellation becomes
effective: Alabama--Insurance Companies v. Raden, 87 Ala. 311. Arizona
-Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. Stephens, 18 Ariz. 339; Section 57
(1827) Insurance Laws. Arkansas-Southern Insurance Company v. Wil-
liams, 62 Ark. 382. Connecticut--Section 4109 Insurance Laws. Florida-
First National Fire Insurance Company of United States v. Burnett, 79
Fla. 424. Georgia-Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Company v. Walker,
150 Ga. 163. lllinois--Annes v. Carolan, Graham, Hoffman Inc., 336 Ill.
542; Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. Tewes, 132 Ill. App. 321;
Kinney v. Rochester German Insurance Company, 141 Ill. App. 543;
Aetna Insurance Company v. Maguire et al., 51 Ill. 342. Indiana--Indiana
Insurance Company v. Hartwell, 100 Ind. 566. Iowa-Harrington et al.
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assured ought immediately be furnished funds with which
to purchase other insurance to replace that being can-
celled.
As shown above, the fire insurance business in this
country is largely carried on by local agents, each of
such agents very often representing several companies.
it sometimes happens that the assured will secure several
policies, one in each of several companies represented by
the agent and pay the agent for some but not for the
others. Thereafter, the agent, being unable to secure
payment of the unpaid policies, will send out notices of
cancellation with respect to all policies, both paid and
v. Bremer County Farmers' Mutual Insurance Association, 203 Iowa 282.
Kentucky-Continental Insurance Company v. Daniel, 25 Ky. L. 1501.
Louisiana-German Fire Insurance Company v. Tooley, 9 Or. App. (La.)
78. Maine-Bard v. Fireman's Insurance Company, 108 Me. 506. Mary-
land-German Union Fire Insurance Company v. Clarke, 116 Md. 622.
Massachusetts-White v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company, 120 Mass.
330. Missouri-Dubinsky v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 196 S. W.
1045; Chrisman & Sawyer Banking Company v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Company, 75 Mo. App. 310. Nebraska-3208 (7807) Insurance Laws;
New York-Tisdell v. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Company, 155 N. Y.
163. Oklahoma-St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Peck,
40 Okla. 396; Taylor v. Insurance Company of North America, 25 Okla.
92. Oregon-Section 22 (i); (6394) Insurance Laws. Pennsylvani--Bald-
win v. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company, 206 Pa. 248; Gosch v. Fire-
men's Insurance Company, 33 Pa. Super. 496. Tennessee--Continental
Insurance Company of New York v. Perry, 138 Tenn. 205. Washington-
Section 108 of Insurance Laws; Snavely v. London Assurance Corp., 128
Wash. 47.
CON=TA: Cali/ornia---Mangrum and Otter, Inc. v. Law Union & Rock
Insurance Company, 172 Cal. 497. Michigan-Webb v. Granite State
Fire Insurance, 164 Mich. 139. New Jersey-Davidson v. German Insur-
ance Company, 74 N. J. L. 487. Ohio--Phoenix Mutual Fire Insurance
Company v. Brecheisen, 50 Ohio 542. Texas-Austin Fire Insurance Com-
pany v. Polemanakos, 207 S. W. 922. All the cases mentioned in this note
were decided under facts involving the old New York form of cancella-
tion clause. Only three decisions have been found construing the new
New York form. These decisions are: Molyneaux v. Royal Exchange
;Assurance, 235 Mich. 678; Pomerantz v. Mutual Fire Insurance Company,
279 Pa. 497; and Hamilton Ridge Lumber Corporation et al. v. Boston
Insurance Company, 133 S. C. 472. Therefore in those states now using
the new New York form of policy, except those states having specific
statutory regulations governing cancellations, it is still problematical as
to the stand which the courts are likely to take regarding the tender of
unearned premiums with the notice of cancellation. In those states
where the new form has supplanted the old and wherein the courts have
said that tender must be made before cancellation becomes effective,
notwithstanding the new form, which makes it optional with the com-
pany to make tender, the courts of such states are still liable to hold
such tender necessary as a matter of public policy.
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unpaid, without tendering the return premium on the
paid policies, and will attempt to apply the return pre-
mium on the paid policies against the earned premium on
the unpaid policies. This procedure will, under the rule
being discussed, result in cancellation of the unpaid poli-
cies but will leave in force the paid policies because of the
agent's failure to remit the return premium thereon with
the notice of cancellation.
If the company has issued two or more policies to the
assured some of which have been paid for and some.not,
the company, when cancelling them, is not justified in ap-
plying the return premium on the paid policies against
the earned but unpaid premium on the other policies.
27
What amounts to or constitutes payment of a pre-
mium so as to require the company to return a cash pre-
mium to the assured on cancellation is often difficult to
determine. Although some diversity of opinion exists
among the courts, there are reported some well consid-
ered insurance law cases tending to support the principle
that the taking of a note from, or even perhaps the exten-
sion of credit to the assured by an agent, effectually pre-
eludes the cancelling of the policies without tender of the
return premiums even if the note or debt is not paid at
maturity, where it appears that the company has received
remittance for the premium from the agent. This is ap-
parently so, because an agent to collect has no authority
to accept commercial paper or anything but cash in dis-
charge of a debt due to his principal ;28 and a note so
taken becomes an ordinary unsecured open account as
between the assured and the agent ;29 as to the company,
the premium has been paid (the agent having advanced
it for the assured), so that assured no longer owes the
company any money but owes the agent only. The com-
pany, therefore, when cancelling, must pay the return
27 Lattan v. Royal Insurance Company, 45 N. J. L. 453.
28 Leader Realty Company v. Markham et al., 163 Mo. App.-314.
29 Buckley v. Citizens Insurance Company of Missouri, 188 N. Y. 399.
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premium in cash direct to the assured.3" The act of the
agent in extending credit to the assured or to assured's
broker, amounts, in substance, to the "payment" of the
premium.3 1 Ordinarily, the company, so long as the agent
pays to it his accounts current, knows nothing of the
relations between the assured and the agent, and as far
as the company's books are concerned the premium is
paid, so that tender of an unearned cash premium direct
to the assured is pre-requisite to a valid cancellation.
Reference to the terms of the cancellation clause of the
new New York standard form indicates that the return
of premium may, but need not, be made with the notice
of cancellation; but if the return premium is not so ten-
dered with the notice, the notice must state that return
premium is payable on demand. Failure of the company
so to state makes the attempted cancellation ineffective. 2
Mention has already been made of the situation, as
respects cancellation, where the insurance company be-
comes and is adjudicated insolvent. A correlative prob-
lem arises where the assured falls into the same difficul-
ties. It is doubtful whether under any of its provisions,
the adjudication of insolvency and the appointment of a
receiver for an assured terminates or makes void a fire
insurance policy written on any of the standard forms.
There are only a few cases on this subject but they lend
support to this view.33 If the insurance is not terminated
by the adjudication of insolvency and the appointment of
a receiver, the latter under familiar rules of law would
have a right within a reasonable time to elect to continue
the existing insurance contracts; or as representative of
the assured's estate, if the insurance is so terminated,
he could consider the contracts of insurance as cancelled
30Alliance Insurance Company v. Poss, 40 Ga. App. 322. See also
Durin v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 240 N. Y. S. 463.
31 White v. Connecticut Insurance Company, 120 Mass. 330.
82Molyneaux v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 235 Mich.-678.
33 Southern Pants Company v. Rochester German Insurance Company,
159 N. C. 78; Bowling v. Continental Insurance Company, 86 W. Va. 164;
Greenwich Bank v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 250 N. Y. 116.
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and demand as assets due the estate the return of the paid
premium thereon, figured, of course, at short rates.
Receivers frequently continue existing insurance in
force and question arises, therefore, whether the insur-
ance company has a right to initiate cancellation of poli-
cies of fire insurance after the appointment of a receiver
and the taking possession by him of the assured's estate
without securing an order of court permitting to the
company the privilege of effecting such cancellation.
There appear to be no decided cases on this point. On
principle, however, it would seem that the insurance com-
pany should have that right, because, if the contract of
insurance was binding on the insurance company in all
respects, including the receiver's right to cancel, it would
appear to be equally obligatory on the receiver in the
event that the company itself should desire to cancel.
Certainly the receiver, in all fairness, should not be al-
lowed to affirm the coverage provided to him by the
policy but to disaffirm some parts of the policy such as
the cancellation clause, which he did not like. If the
receiver accepted the insurance, he, by a well known rule
of law, must take the burdens imposed upon him by the
contract as well as the benefits furnished to him there-
under. It would also seem true that as a matter of pub-
lic policy insurance companies should have untrammeled
right to cancel fire insurance when they feel their rela-
tions to assureds to be intolerable, even if a paritcular
assured is an estate in a receiver's hands, for the reason
that if the law develops in such a fashion that an insur-
ance company, after the policy has once attached in favor
of a receiver cannot cancel without permission, a thing
which may be withheld, the insurance companies will be
increasingly loath to write any insurance in the future for
any receiver and thus deprive society, especially in peri-
ods of economic distress, of the protection which, in most
cases, should be freely given.
Upon cancellation of the insurance contract the return
premium is determined according to short rate and pro
rata premium charges, the application of either of which
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depends on who initiates cancellation. Fire insurance
rates are customarily developed to write insurance dur-
ing one, three or five year periods, the three year rate be-
ing two and one-half, and the five year rate, four times
the annual rate. Rates for odd periods less than one,
three or five years are very much higher than the rates
for such standard periods. For that reason assureds
would take out policies for standard periods at the low
rates and then cancel the policy a short time after, thus
obtaining short term insurance at the same low rate as
standard term insurance. To discourage this practice
and, further, to protect the company against loss by rea-
son of early cancellation, it having incurred the expense
incident to the writing of the policy, a custom has de-
veloped in the fire insurance business and is embodied
in the cancellation clause8" whereby the company, when
the cancellation is initiated by the assured, is entitled to
an earned premium based on short rates85 for the time
the policy was actually in force; and so as to discourage
the company from cancelling a risk after it has run for a
period less than one, three or five years, in order to se-
cure a possible short rate against the assured, the can-
cellation clause allows the assured a return premium pro
rata when the policy is cancelled at the instance of the
company. The cancellation clauses, therefore, so far as
premium charges are concerned, protect each party
against improper motives for cancellation by the other.
Another point of interest germane to this subject, is
the treatment of a return premium when the policy ceases
or becomes void after it has once attached to the risk.
Of the three standard cancellation clauses, the old New
York standard clause 6 is the only one which provides for
such a case. The assured, under that clause, will be en-
titled to a return premium if he conveys away the prop-
erty insured so as to cause the insurance thereon in his
34 See footnotes 2, 3 and 4 above.
85 A short rate table, on account of its length, is not set out herein,
but one may be obtained at practically any fire insurance agency.
36 See footnote 3 above.
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favor to cease, or if for some forfeiture on assured's
part the insurance becomes void. It is doubtful, however,
if assured could recover premiums on a policy containing
such a clause where such policy was fraudulently pro-
cured by the assured.1
7
Another point incidental to this subject concerns the
case where the policy has attached to the risk and through
some cause set in motion by the assured the policy is or
may be forfeited. In such a case, the company, if it
learns of the cause of forfeiture before loss, is said to be
under the duty to initiate cancellation, and its failure to
do so waives the forfeiture.3
Although the standard cancellation clauses herein dis-
cussed do not provide for partial cancellation, that situa-
tioA may occur in a case wherein the policy insures two
different items of property and a total loss on one item
occurs and is paid on that item. The policy is exhausted,
reduced or cancelled to the extent of the amount paid on
that one item but remains in force as to the other ;9 or
partial cancellation may occur by reduction of the amount
of the policy. In that case the company must serve the
usual notice and return the paid premium applicable to
the amount thus reduced before such partial cancellation
is effected.
40
87 National Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Duncan, 44 Colo. 472.
This was a case of fraudulent overvaluation of property made by assured.
38 Patten v. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 223 Mo.
App. 1070. See also generally 26 C. J. 330, 414.
39 Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Company v. Chisenhall, 162 Ark.
231.
40 Transit Lumber Company v. International Indemnity Company et
al., 153 Wash. 594.
